Current user bootstrap payload
/user/me
The profile of whoever the credential belongs to, plus one entry per organization they are an active member of, each carrying that org's roles, teams and effective permissions. Call this first: it is how a client learns which organization ids it may put in `X-Organization-Id` and which actions to offer. With an org API token this still returns the token owner's memberships, so read `organizations` rather than assuming the token's org is the only one.
Response Body
false while an organization the user belongs to requires a second factor and they hold no passkey — turning the authenticator app off (DELETE /user/me/mfa/totp) is refused with 409 mfa_required_by_organization. The reason is in mfa_disable_blocked_reason.
User id (usr_…).
Login identities linked to this account.
e.g. google, email_code, invite, or an SSO connection.
Inactive accounts cannot authenticate at all.
Platform staff who are also a member of the root organization — gates the staff console.
Platform staff flag. Unrelated to organization roles.
A sentence saying why can_disable_mfa is false, or null.
True when TOTP is active on this account.
True when THIS session would be refused (403 mfa_setup_required) in at least one organization the user belongs to, because the organization requires a second factor and the session has not shown one. Always false for an API token. A client routes the person to second-factor setup on this rather than working out which organizations require one.
How many organizations refuse this session for lack of a second factor.
The organizations behind mfa_setup_required: a bounded page (at most 50), with the organization named by the current_org_id query parameter first when it is one of them. Not the whole set — mfa_setup_required_org_count is the true number; an organization not listed still refuses with 403 mfa_setup_required when entered.
One entry per active membership. Organizations where membership has lapsed are omitted.
Membership facts only — roles and teams are the sibling fields below, not nested here.
4 properties
User id (usr_…).
How they joined, e.g. invite or verified domain.
22 properties
Whether Elaichi staff may impersonate this organization's members for support. true by default. When false, every request an impersonated session makes against this organization is refused with 403 staff_impersonation_blocked, reads included, and the organization is left out of that session's GET /user/me and GET /organization. Changed with PATCH /organization/{id} (org:manage).
Why can_authorize_apps is false, in the gate's own order: blocked, then pending_deletion (even when the subscription is also gone, since a soft delete cancels it), then no_plan. null when connecting is open.
blockedpending_deletionno_plannull
Whether the CALLER may connect an app (MCP OAuth consent) to this organization right now: false while it is suspended, scheduled for deletion, or has no active plan. Server-computed by the same gate POST /oauth/authorize-request/{id}/approve calls; present only on member-scoped responses. authorize_apps_blocked_reason says which.
Whether the CALLER may delete this organization — the org:delete permission, which only the Org Owner role holds, and never for the platform root organization. Server-computed: branch on this rather than inspecting roles. Always false where the response has no member context to compute it from — the org switcher list GET /organization (one member-context lookup per row would be a per-row round trip), the staff console, and the invite-accept response. It never overstates: trust it when true, and read GET /user/me or GET /organization/{id} (both of which compute it) when you need it for a list row.
Whether the CALLER may change this organization's own settings — the org:manage permission that PATCH /organization/{id} requires, and the organization neither staff-suspended nor in its deletion grace period. Server-computed, and false wherever can_delete is for lack of a member context; it never overstates.
Whether the CALLER may turn mfa_required ON right now: can_manage, from an interactive session that would itself pass the check it is about to create. false — with the reason in can_require_mfa_reason — when switching it on would lock the caller out of this organization. The PATCH refuses that regardless with 409 mfa_setup_required. Turning it OFF is not governed by this field; it needs a step-up.
A sentence saying why can_require_mfa is false for a caller who can otherwise manage the organization. null otherwise.
Whether the CALLER may cancel a scheduled deletion: the org:manage permission, and only while purge_after is still ahead. Server-computed, like can_delete, and false for the same reasons — no member context (the org switcher list, the staff console) — plus once the window has closed. Read purge_after to tell "too late" from "not yours to undo".
Set when a deletion has been scheduled (DELETE /organization/{id}). The organization is read-only until purge_after. Null otherwise.
Organization id (org_…) — the value for X-Organization-Id.
Public URL of the logo image, or null.
Whether members must hold a second factor to act in this organization. false by default, for existing and new organizations alike. When true, a signed-in session that has not shown a second factor — no TOTP challenge at login, not a passkey sign-in, no factor enrolled since — is refused on every organization-scoped route, reads included, with 403 mfa_setup_required (error.details.has_second_factor says whether the person already has one and only needs to sign in with it). Exempt: org API tokens, Elaichi staff impersonation sessions, and a session signed in through THIS organization's own SSO connection. MCP connections made before it was switched on, or from a session without a factor, are refused too until the person connects again. Turning it OFF only lifts that requirement: a member who set up an authenticator app of their own is still challenged for it at every non-passkey sign-in, because the factor belongs to the member and no organization setting can switch it off. Changed with PATCH /organization/{id} (org:manage, interactive session only).
The stored plan: gold, black, or none when locked. This is not the same as the effective entitlement — read GET /organization/{id}/entitlements before gating a feature on it.
When a scheduled deletion becomes permanent — 30 days after deletion_scheduled_at. Null unless scheduled.
Data location fixed at creation: us/eu pin a hard jurisdiction, apac is a placement hint.
Free-form org settings. PATCH /organization/{id} REPLACES this object wholesale.
Immutable after creation.
When staff granted an indefinite trial, or null. Unlocked with no end date: no countdown, no expiry email, billing still reachable.
Effective permission names, unioned across roles. This is the authoritative list for deciding what to show; the server re-checks it on every request.
Role summaries held in this organization.
4 properties
Role id (role_…).
billablefree_admin
2 properties
Team id (team_…).
curl -X GET 'https://api.elaichi.ai/user/me' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer $ELAICHI_API_TOKEN' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json'const response = await fetch('https://api.elaichi.ai/user/me', {
method: 'GET',
headers: {
'Authorization': 'Bearer ' + process.env.ELAICHI_API_TOKEN,
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
},
});
const data = await response.json();
console.log(data);import os
import requests
url = "https://api.elaichi.ai/user/me"
headers = {
"Authorization": f"Bearer {os.environ['ELAICHI_API_TOKEN']}",
"Content-Type": "application/json",
}
response = requests.get(url, headers=headers)
print(response.json())